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Measuring default risk in the trading 
book
Introduction 
Risk management in the trading book implies the meas-
urement of all the components of risk, including the risk 
arising from fluctuations in asset prices and risk related 
to  defaults.  Differences  in  the  statistical  characteristics 
of  these  two  types  of  risk,  however,  imply  that  tools 
geared  to  the  measurement  of  risk  from  market  price 
fluctuations may not adequately capture the risk of losses 
due  to  default.  Practical  methodologies  used  by  banks 
have focused primarily on measuring the former type of 
risk. At the same time, the volume of default-sensitive 
securities that are actively traded by banks has increased 
exponentially over the past decade. These developments 
have  recently  prompted  regulators  to  propose  new 
requirements that explicitly highlight the need for banks 
to develop methodologies that include the additional risk 
from default in their assessment of overall trading book 
risk. An important aspect of the new regulatory propos-
als for measuring the incremental risk related to obligor 
default for trading book positions is that capital standards 
for these risks depend on the liquidity of the markets for 
trading default-sensitive securities.
This  article  discusses  some  of  the  issues  related  to  the 
measurement of incremental default risk in the context 
of a trading book portfolio. It is divided into three sec-
tions. The first section discusses the nature of market and 
default risk in the trading book and describes the present 
regulatory treatment of market risk as well as the new 
regulatory proposals to include a capital requirement for 
default risk. The second section analyses how standard 
models of default risk can be adjusted to take account 
for the specific nature of the trading book, namely that 
positions  are  actively  managed.  The  third  section  illus-
trates the potential impact of the assumptions about the 
liquidity  of  trading  book  positions  on  the  new  capital 
requirements for default risk and compare the impact of 
a change in liquidity and a change in the credit quality   
of the assets.
1.    Default risk meets market risk in the 
trading book
1.1    Definition of trading book
Regulatory  rules  and  thereby  business  practices  distin-
guish between the trading and banking books of banks. 
The most important distinction between the two books 
is the horizon over which risk is managed. Banking book 
assets tend to be held for longer time horizons and are 
subject to regulatory capital requirements for credit risk. 
The trading book consists of positions which are actively 
traded at high frequencies or positions which are held to 
hedge banking book positions, and which are currently 
subject  to  capital  requirements  for  market  risk.  Typical 
positions in the trading book include tradable securities, 
such as bonds and equities, and derivatives, like swaps 
and futures, for which active markets are well-established. 
Over  the  last  decade,  an  increasing  number  of  credit-
sensitive instruments have also entered the trading book, 
for  which  markets  were  previously  inexistent  but  have 
recently been developing at a rapid pace. 
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Regulators define the trading book as consisting of “[…] 
positions in financial instruments and commodities held 
either  with  trading  intent  or  in  order  to  hedge  other 
elements of the trading book. Positions held with trad-
ing  intent  are  those  held  intentionally  for  short-term 
resale and/or with the intent of benefiting from actual or 
expected short-term price movements or to lock in arbi-
trage profits. To be eligible for trading book capital treat-
ment, financial instruments should be free of restrictive 
covenants on their tradability or able to be hedged com-
pletely. In addition, the positions need to be frequently 
and  accurately  valued  and  positions  should  be  actively 
managed” (BCBS, 2006, §685 and §687). 
1.2    Market risk in the trading book
Conventionally,  the  trading  book  includes  mainly  items 
that  are  particularly  sensitive  to  market  risk.  In  1996, 
regulators introduced rules for banks to provide an explicit 
capital cushion for the risks that arise from their trading 
activities  (BCBS,  1996).  The  minimum  capital  require-
ments that banks need to hold for their trading book posi-
tions are expressed in terms of two separately calculated 
charges.  One  charge  applies  to  “general  market  risk”, 
which is thought of as the systematic (e.g. non-diversifi-
able) component of market risk typically associated with 
movements in broad asset prices. An example is given by 
the risk of a decline in the price of bonds held in response 
to an increase in the level of the risk-free interest rates. 
The other charge is for the “specific market risk” of each 
security, which represents an idiosyncratic movement in 
price. For instance, the price of a bond can fall because 
of a merger announcement, earnings surprises or because 
of changes in the creditworthiness of the bond issuer.  (1) 
Total market risk capital charges are the simple sum of 
the capital charge for general market risk and the capital 
charge for specific risk.
Banks can use a standardised measurement or an internal 
model approach to assess capital requirements in the trad-
ing book. In the standardised measurement approach, the 
risk charges follow a highly structured process. Exposures 
are  broken  down  into  different  risk  categories  such  as 
interest rate instruments, equities, foreign exchange and 
commodities. Net positions, which are long minus short 
positions,  are  multiplied  by  risk  weights  to  obtain  the 
general market and specific market risk capital charge. 
General  risk  for  interest-bearing  securities  is  measured 
either through the maturity method, in which net posi-
tions are risk-weighted according to their residual matu-
rity, or through the duration method, where the weight-
ing depends on price sensitivity as a result of an interest 
rate shock. Specific risk weights depend on factors related 
to  the  individual  security.  For  equities,  the  specific  risk 
requirements are 8 p.c. on net positions unless the port-
folio is both liquid and well-diversified, in which case the 
charge will be 4 p.c., while the general market risk charge 
is 8 p.c. in both cases. For foreign exchange risk and for 
commodity risk, the specific risk charge is zero, the gen-
eral market risk charge is respectively 8 p.c. and 15 p.c. 
on the net position.
In the internal model approach, banks have the flexibility 
to develop their own specific models to measure general 
and specific risk. These models are used to measure the 
sensitivity of the market value of trading exposures, and 
thus of potential losses, to movements in risk factors, such 
as interest rates. The dynamics of the risk factors typi-
cally lead to symmetric loss distributions, from which risk 
measures such as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) can be derived. 
The VaR of a portfolio is defined as the maximum loss 
over a given period of time (the holding period) which is 
not expected to be exceeded with a certain probability 
(the confidence level). Regulatory rules set the following 
minimum standards for the risk assessment models. The 
VaR needs to be calculated assuming a uniform ten-day 
horizon and a 99 p.c. statistical confidence level, meaning 
that there is a 1 p.c. chance the portfolio could lose more 
than the VaR estimate in the next ten days. The capital 
charges  need  to  be  the  higher  of  the  previous  day’s 
(VaR) figure and the average daily VaR of the preceding 
sixty business days. VaR can be measured for the sepa-
rate  risk  categories  (interest  rate  instruments,  equities, 
foreign exchange and commodities) and be summed up 
afterwards. Hereby, banks are allowed to take account of 
possible diversification benefits across the risk categories 
so the total VaR may be less than the sum of the VaR of 
the different risk categories. 
At the time the market risk capital rules were adopted, 
the requirements set out in the internal model approach 
worked well for the trading positions of a large number 
of  banks.  However,  even  then,  banks  and  supervisors 
alike acknowledged that certain risks, such as default risk 
and other types of event risk, were not well captured in 
VaR models.  (2) Therefore, supervisors were led to impose 
a  safety  multiplier  on  internally-modelled  estimates  of 
general market and specific risk. This factor must be at 
least three but can be set at a higher level (up to four) 
according  to  the  supervisor’s  evaluation  of  the  bank’s 
models  and  backtesting  results.  (3)  The  multiplication 
(1)  Changes in the creditworthiness include changes in probabilities of default as 
well as changes in rating migrations (downgrades and upgrades).
(2)  Other examples of event risk are migration risk, risk of a takeover bid or some 
other shock event (see BCBS, 2006, p 163).
(3)  Backtesting is the process of validating a model for estimating VaR by comparing 
actual outcomes with those produced by the model. 165
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factor was thus initially introduced as a correction factor   
for model risk.
1.3    Increased sensitivity of the trading book to 
default risk
The Basel Committee has recently proposed a new capi-
tal requirement for default risk in the trading book that 
will be incremental to the 1996 capital requirement for 
market risk. The decision was motivated by concern about 
increasing levels of default risk in banks’ trading books, 
the desire to guide the development of more adequate 
tools that can capture default risk in that book, as well as 
to minimise any distortion in banks’ incentives from differ-
ences in the regulatory treatment of similar types of risk in 
the banking and trading book. 
Indeed,  since  the  1996  regulations  were  introduced, 
there has been a rapid expansion of default risk in the 
trading book. This growth in default risk is mainly due to 
the rapid development of the credit risk transfer market. 
Instruments  like  collateralised  debt  obligations  (CDOs), 
for example, have become increasingly important com-
ponents  of  banks’  trading  book  portfolios.(1)  Figure  1 
illustrates the steady growth in global CDO market issu-
ance from the beginning of 2004 until the first quarter of 
2008. The turmoil in the credit markets during the second 
half of 2007, which was characterised by illiquidity among 
a  large  number  of  default-related  instruments,  caused 
CDO  issues  to  plummet.  This  latter  observation  also 
illustrates the fact that CDOs and other default-related 
products may not be as liquid as other securities positions 
in the trading book. 
For a number of reasons, internal VaR models for market 
risk may fail to capture the entirety of default risk embed-
ded in credit products. Firstly, internal VaR calculations 
are  based  upon  historically  observed  market  prices, 
which,  by  construction,  are  based  on  non-defaulted 
exposures. Secondly, default events are rare events, but 
when they do occur, losses can be high. This implies that 
in practice, models that capture default events need to 
produce fat-tailed loss distributions. Thirdly, the default 
risk of a position depends on the holding period and the 
liquidity of the position. Risk related to default-sensitive 
exposures,  which  are  often  not  as  liquid  as  market-
sensitive  exposures,  will  not  be  captured  by  models 
that assume a ten-day risk horizon. Therefore, internal 
VaR models for market risk are typically not suitable for 
measuring the default risk associated with the sudden 
failure of an issuer.
It is important that banks’ risk measurement systems  take 
sufficient account of all the risks related to trading book 
positions,  including  default  risk,  in  their  risk  measure-
ment systems. If not, trading book business can be run at 
lower capital requirements than the banking book, which 
may lead to arbitrage possibilities with further undesired 
consequences on behaviour. The introduction of the mul-
tiplication factor reflected the possibility that the method 
of using VaR models may underestimate the frequency of 
large losses. This factor, however, is a crude attempt to 
provide a correction to known deficiencies, but is argu-
ably too simple to capture the true nature of default risk 
in different portfolios and circumstances. In addition, it 
may have given banks capital incentives to move assets 
from the banking to the trading book. It may even have 
created disincentives for banks to improve their specific 
risk models as they may have preferred to apply the mul-
tiplication factor of four.
The  recently  proposed  capital  rules  include  an  explicit 
requirement  for  banks  to  develop  adequate  method-
ologies  for  measuring  default  risk  in  the  trading  book   
(BCBS, 2006).(2) These rules, although published in 2006, 
have not yet been implemented. Banks that have already 
received  internal  model  recognition  for  the  specific 
risk under the 1996 capital requirement rules will have 
until 2010 to implement the incremental default charge. 
(1)  Annual reports by banks rarely provide information about credit risk-related 
trading book exposures.
(2)  The new trading rules also cover issues such as the treatment of counterparty 
credit risk, of double default effects, short-term maturities and unsettled and 
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The other banks will need to agree with their supervisors 
to implement the new rules in as timely manner as prac-
ticable. The rules are set out in very high standards (see 
Box 1) and specify that banks must develop their own 
methodology  for  measuring  default  risk  in  the  trading 
book. In addition to these rules, the Basel Committee has 
proposed a set of guiding principles on how banks should 
put these rules in practice and on how supervisors will 
assess these internal models. These guidelines were issued 
for  comment  in  October  2007  (BCBS,  2007).  Recently, 
the Basel Committee announced (BCBS, 16 April 2008) 
its  plans  to  extend  the  scope  of  its  existing  proposed 
guidelines for the incremental default risk to include other 
potential event risks in the trading book. The Committee 
expects to issue its new risk proposal for public consulta-
tion later in 2008 and plans to conduct a quantitative 
impact assessment. In what follows, the article focuses on 
the new rules for default risk.
The new rules cover trading book instruments that are 
subject to default risk and strive to achieve greater coher-
ence in the treatment of similar risks in the bank’s differ-
ent books.  (1) Banks will not be allowed to take account 
of possible diversification benefits between default and 
market risk in the trading book, which is consistent with 
current rules that do not allow banks to take account of 
Box 1  –  Basel II capital requirements for incremental default risk (BCBS, 2006)
The requirement for the incremental default charge is set out in the form of the following standards :
718(xcii). “In addition, the bank must have an approach in place to capture in its regulatory capital default risk 
of its trading book positions that is incremental to the risk captured by the VaR-based calculation as specified in 
paragraph 718(LXXXViii) above. To avoid double counting a bank may, when calculating its incremental default 
charge, take into account the extent to which default risk has already been incorporated into the VaR calculation, 
especially for risk positions that could and would be closed within ten days in the event of adverse market 
conditions or other indications of deterioration in the credit environment. No specific approach for capturing the 
incremental default risk is prescribed ; it may be part of the bank’s internal model or a surcharge from a separate 
calculation. Where a bank captures its incremental risk through a surcharge, the surcharge will not be subject to 
a multiplier three or regulatory backtesting, although the bank should be able to demonstrate that the surcharge 
meets its aim.“ 
718(xciii).  “Whichever  approach  is  used,  the  bank  must  demonstrate  that  it  meets  a  soundness  standard 
comparable to that of the internal ratings-based approach for credit risk as set forth in this Framework, under 
the assumption of a constant level of risk, and adjusted where appropriate to reflect the impact of liquidity, 
concentrations, hedging, and optionality. A bank that does not capture the incremental default risk through an 
internally developed approach must use the fallback of calculating the surcharge through an approach consistent 
with that for credit risk as set forth in this Framework.”
diversification benefits between default risk in the bank-
ing book and market risk in the trading book. This non-
recognition of diversification effects has been highly criti-
cised by the industry (see ISDA, IIF, LIBA, 2007). Banks will 
nevertheless be allowed to subtract the capital require-
ment for default losses implicit in their internal VaR-based 
capital computation to avoid double counting, assuming 
they can demonstrate that the VaR actually captures some 
part of losses related to default. The incremental default 
capital charge will not be subject to the safety multiplier. 
The maximum specific risk (excluding default) multiplier 
of  four  will  be  replaced  with  a  multiplier  of  three.  A 
novelty of the trading book rules is that firms are allowed 
to measure the default risk of trading book instruments 
while taking liquidity into account. This will be discussed 
in detail in the next section.
(1)  As with banking book positions, banks need to take account of possible 
concentration risk in their risk measurement of trading activities. Concentration 
risk can come from an excessive exposure towards a particular name or a 
particular sector. Techniques to measure concentration risk in trading book do not 
differ from techniques to calculate this risk in the banking book. Therefore, for a 
discussion on concentration risk, we refer to that literature. (BCBS, 2006b)167
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2.    Modelling default and liquidity risk 
in the trading book
The mere fact that an asset is intended for trading does 
not alter the basic nature of the underlying risks but it does 
affect the combination of the different risks in a portfolio 
(see the discussion in Masschelein and Tsatsaronis, 2008). 
Banks should therefore be able, at least in principle, to use 
models developed for measuring default risk in the bank-
ing book in order to calculate default risk capital charges 
for trading book positions. Indeed, this is a principle that 
has  been  adopted  by  regulators.  New  regulatory  rules 
allow banks to develop their own credit risk models in 
accordance  with  the  regulatory  models  for  default  risk 
in the banking book and to apply the appropriate con-
fidence  level  for  distributions  reflecting  low  probability 
and high-severity events, e.g. 99.9 p.c. The capital rules 
for default risk in the banking book, however, are not 
sufficiently  flexible  to  be  applied  in  the  context  of  the 
trading book as they assume a buy-and-hold strategy and 
do not account for the active management of exposures 
in  the  trading  book.  For  this  reason,  the  trading  book 
framework is amended by introducing four concepts : the 
liquidity horizon, the unavoidable default ratio, the capital 
horizon and the constant level of risk approach. These are 
discussed below.
Active  management  of  default  risk  for  tradable  posi-
tions involves the elimination of risk through hedging or 
disposal  of  deteriorating  positions.  Therefore,  the  rules 
introduce the concept of a liquidity horizon, which is 
the time horizon required to hedge or sell the risk of a 
position.  Banks  are  required  to  choose  an  appropriate 
liquidity horizon which is consistent with their risk man-
agement process and with actual trading experience in 
rebalancing  similar  positions  during  stressed  conditions 
when  these  positions  suffer  a  decline  in  credit  quality. 
The liquidity horizon is at least ten business days, which is 
the minimum horizon for market capital rules. The implicit 
minimum liquidity horizon for banking book positions is 
one year.
Independently  of  the  liquidity  of  the  positions,  default 
risk can be avoided only if it can be foreseen during the 
period corresponding to the liquidity horizon. The notion 
of  the  unavoidable  default  ratio  accounts  for  this 
predictability of defaults. It is defined as the proportion 
of defaults that cannot be foreseen or avoided within a 
given liquidity horizon. The ratio would be equal to one if 
all defaults occur as surprises within the liquidity horizon. 
In this case, default losses cannot be avoided and default 
risk for a liquid book is exactly the same as that for an 
illiquid book over the same horizon. In other words, active 
risk management does not reduce risk. By contrast, if no 
defaults occur unexpectedly within the liquidity horizon, 
then a bank could avoid losses from all defaults by selling 
or by hedging the risk of the deteriorating exposures. The 
unavoidable default ratio in this case would be zero. In 
practice, the unavoidable default ratio is not likely to be a 
binary variable : it may vary between zero and one. Some, 
but not all, defaults may come as a surprise. It is expected 
that the longer the liquidity horizon, the more difficult it 
is to avoid the default of that exposure as firms have to 
wait longer before they can sell or hedge the risk of the 
exposure. Unavoidable default ratios are thus likely to be 
larger for portfolios with longer liquidity horizons. They 
may also depend on the credit quality of the assets held 
in the trading book. The ratios are expected to be smaller 
for investment-grade positions and bigger for speculative-
grade positions (see Dunn et al., 2006).
The fact that firms may reduce their default risk when 
markets  are  liquid  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  it  is 
appropriate  to  measure  capital  requirements  assuming 
that the capital horizon, which is the time horizon over 
which capital is assessed, should be equal to the liquid-
ity  horizon.  It  is  important  for  banks  to  be  sufficiently 
capitalised  when  suffering  large  trading  losses.  Capital 
is  there  to  absorb  losses,  thereby  allowing  banks  to 
continue to operate as a going concern during periods 
when losses are being experienced (see also BCBS, 2007). 
Further, banks are often not affected in isolation when 
financial  markets  are  liquidity-distressed.  Market  liquid-
ity stress is likely to affect many financial institutions at 
the  same  time.  This  may  make  it  very  costly  and  very 
time-consuming for banks to raise additional capital or to 
change the dividend policy in distressed financial markets. 
Therefore, like the banking book rules, current guidelines 
from regulators for the trading book (BCBS, 2007) set the 
capital horizon at one year. The industry is highly criti-
cal of the one-year capital horizon, arguing that raising 
capital in the marketplace does not take a year as implied 
by a one-year capital horizon. In fact, practitioners have 
recently re-interpreted the multiplication factor of three to 
imply a sixty-day horizon and a 99.9 p.c. confidence level, 
since three times the typical VaR at a ten-day horizon at a 
99 p.c. confidence level is actually very close to a typical 
VaR measured at a sixty-day horizon at the 99.9 p.c. con-
fidence level. Therefore, the industry argues in favour of a 
sixty-day capital horizon (see ISDA, LIBA, IIF, 2007).
To bridge the gap between the one-year capital and the 
shorter-term liquidity horizon, regulatory rules specify that 
capital needs to be measured assuming that the positions 
of the portfolio are rebalanced at every liquidity horizon 
to achieve a constant level of (default) risk over the 
capital horizon. This concept relates directly to the pre-
sumed objective of active risk management. It assumes 168
that  exposures  which  see  a  significant  change  in  their 
risk profile are sold and replaced with other exposures 
in order to achieve an overall distribution of risk profiles 
that is similar to that of the original portfolio. If an expo-
sure  deteriorates  gradually  over  the  capital  horizon,  it 
is reasonable to assume that the bank would reduce its 
exposure  and  avoid  suffering  a  loss  from  default.  This 
constant  level  of  risk  assumption  does  not  mean  that 
banks should hold the same risk profile over the capital 
horizon.  It  only  means  that  they  need  to  measure  the 
capital for the portfolio as if the risk profiles were constant 
over time. Rebalancing comes at a cost because there has 
been a loss on the position being downgraded and sold. 
However, this loss should be captured by the internal VaR 
and should be an element of the 1996 capital charge.  (1) 
In the banking book, capital requirements are measured 
under the assumption of a constant level of positions over 
a one-year capital horizon. 
3.    Impact of the liquidity assumption 
on default charge
This section uses example portfolios of (traded) securities 
to illustrate the concepts outlined above in the measure-
ment of incremental default risk. It examines the impact 
of the assumptions about the liquidity horizon of trad-
ing book positions on capital requirements. The analysis 
also  provides  a  rough  measure  of  the  relative  effects 
of a shift in the liquidity horizon and a deterioration in 
portfolio  credit  quality  in  terms  of  the  assessed  capital 
requirements. 
3.1  Methodology
As discussed above, regulators do not impose a particular 
model for the measurement of the incremental default 
risk. For the purpose of this section, risk is measured in a 
default-only model, where the value of a position, which 
is commonly referred to as the asset return, is driven by a 
single common factor and an idiosyncratic factor specific 
to each individual exposure. The two factors are assumed 
to  be  independent  from  each  other  and  normally  dis-
tributed. A linear correlation coefficient summarises the 
interdependence (co-movements) between asset returns 
underlying different exposures. The probability of default 
(PD)  of  any  individual  exposure  is  the  probability  that 
the asset return falls below a certain default threshold. 
The  loss  for  each  defaulted  position  in  the  portfolio  is 
calculated  by  multiplying  the  loss  given  default  (LGD) 
with the exposure size. Losses for the entire portfolio are 
then calculated by adding up the losses of each exposure 
in default. This model is similar to that underpinning the 
capital formula used to measure capital requirements for 
banking book exposures (see Gordy, 2003). Monte Carlo 
simulations are used to generate the loss distribution, and 
risk measures, such as economic capital, can be derived 
from this loss distribution.
The  PDs,  LGDs  and  correlations  need  to  be  measured 
over the capital horizon taking account of the fact that 
losses can be avoided by rebalancing the portfolio. Little is 
known yet about how LGDs and correlations are affected 
by the rebalancing and, therefore, we focus here on the 
probabilities of default. The PDs, which are used in the 
simulations, are calculated over a one-year capital horizon 
and take account of the fact that defaults in the portfolio 
can  be  (partially)  avoided  by  rebalancing  the  portfolio 
over the liquidity horizon by reference to the unavoidable 
default ratio. The defaults that materialise between the 
points where the portfolio is rebalanced are those that 
could not have been foreseen or avoided. The PDs, which 
are used in the simulations, can therefore be measured as 
the probability of default over the capital horizon times 
the unavoidable default ratio (which is the proportion of 
defaults that cannot be avoided over the capital horizon). 
This is equivalent to multiplying the probability of default 
over the liquidity horizon by the number of times the port-
folio is rebalanced over the capital horizon (which equals 
the capital horizon over the liquidity horizon). Under each 
formulation,  there  is  the  implicit  assumption  that  the 
level of risk is constant over the capital horizon and that 
unavoidable defaults are independently distributed over 
consecutive liquidity intervals.
More formally, the PDs used in the simulations are meas-
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liquidity horizon
==   (Eq. 1)
where  liq PD  = PD over the liquidity horizon liq ;








UDR =   (Eq. 2)
where UDR = unavoidable default ratio
(see also Dunn et al., 2006). (1)  In practice, however, banks often use average spreads for a particular rating class 
as a basis for their VaR estimates, which may not be sensitive to the idiosyncratic 
risk embedded in the individual securities. The average spreads may suffer from 
some type of survivorship bias since they reflect risk of a portfolio with a constant 
credit rating. 169
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3.2  Data
Measuring probabilities of default over a short liquidity 
horizon, e.g.  liq PD , poses some challenges. One way is to 
calculate the default ratio over a shorter time span. The 
probability of default is then the number of defaults over 
a certain period over the number of firms in the sample at 
the beginning of the period (see also Dunn et al., 2006). 
However, there is very little understanding of intra-year 
default behaviour. One of the obstacles associated with 
measuring probabilities of default over short horizons is 
the low number of defaults in the higher rating catego-
ries and for newly-developed instruments, in particular. 
It is not unusual for a portfolio of highly rated positions 
to register no default events for many shorter periods. 
In addition, a portfolio which includes many new instru-
ments may not have experienced enough defaults either. 
There is no clear solution on how to deal with this issue. 
However, it is important that banks are aware that short 
run PD estimates are subject to this uncertainty.
The PD over the capital horizon,  cap PD , is derived from 
credit ratings, as set out in Table 1. Unavoidable default 
ratios, taken from Dunn et al. (2006) where they are cal-
culated as described in equation (2) above, are presented 
in Table 2. The table suggests that unavoidable default 
ratios increase in line with the liquidity horizon and decline 
with credit quality of the underlying credit. The relatively 
high unavoidable default ratio of A1-A3 exposures at a 
six-month liquidity horizon is an exception in this respect 
and is likely to be due to the limitations with measuring 
probabilities of default at short horizons.
Economic capital is calculated for a number of homoge-
neous  portfolios  of  tradable  loans.  Each  portfolio  with 
differing credit quality is highly granular and represents 
a total volume of 2,000,000 monetary units that consists 
of 2,000 loan exposures of equal size, implying a highly 
granular portfolio. (1) Loss severity, or the rate of loss given 
default, is assumed to be uniform across portfolios equal to 
60 p.c.  (2) The correlation across exposures is also assumed 
(1)  The impact of concentration on economic capital has been illustrated in Düllmann 
and Masschelein (2006).
(2)  This is in line with data on market expectations of entity-specific LGDs, as 
reported by Markit.
TABLE  1  1-YEAR PROBABILITIES OF DEFAULT  
PER RATING CLASS ( cap PD  )
(percentages)
 
Aaa  ........................................... 0
Aa1  ........................................... 0
Aa2  ........................................... 0
Aa3  ........................................... 0  .017
A1  ............................................ 0  .02
A2  ............................................ 0  .024
A3  ............................................ 0  .034
Baa1   ........................................... 0  .151
Baa2   ........................................... 0  .16
Baa3   ........................................... 0  .32
Ba1   ............................................ 0  .716
Ba2   ............................................ 0  .813
Ba3   ............................................ 1  .843
B1   ............................................. 2  .931
B2   ............................................. 4  .58
B3   ............................................. 9  .05
Source : Moody’s.
 















Aaa  ............................... 0 0 0 0 100
Aa1-Aa3  ........................... 0 0 0 32 100
A1-A3  ............................. 13 18 22 71 100
Baa1-Baa3  .......................... 13 18 43 64 100
Ba1-Ba3  ............................ 30 34 55 73 100
B1-B3  .............................. 53 60 71 82 100
Source : Dunn et al. (2006) based on data for the period 1970-2004.
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to be uniform set either at 12 p.c. or at 24 p.c. The choice 
of correlation assumptions corresponds to the least and 
the most conservative correlation estimates assumed for 
corporate exposures in the Basel II Framework. In line with 
the guidelines from the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2007), 
the capital horizon is set at one year. The number of simu-
lation runs for each portfolio is set at 100,000.
3.3  Results
Table 3 shows economic capital as a percentage of port-
folio value for a number of homogeneous portfolios that 
differ in terms of both credit quality and liquidity horizon. 
Results are presented assuming a 24 p.c. correlation and a 
12 p.c. correlation estimate. The capital charges assuming 
a one-year liquidity horizon are similar to the minimum 
required charges for banking book positions. 
Not surprisingly, capital requirements increase for portfo-
lios with longer liquidity horizons and for portfolios with 
more risky securities. It is interesting, however, to analyse 
the  two  dimensions  together.  Academic  literature  has 
pointed up the positive relationship between default and 
illiquidity (see, e.g., Ericsson and Renault, 2006). The cur-
rent financial market turmoil has also illustrated the fact 
that generalised market distress situations often go hand 
in hand with an evaporation of market liquidity as well as 
an increase in default risk. 
Table 3 compares the effect of a deterioration in credit 
quality  on  economic  capital  with  the  impact  of  an 
evaporation of liquidity on economic capital. An A3-rated 
(A–) portfolio with a two-week horizon and assuming a 
24 p.c. correlation requires 0.24 p.c. capital in percentage 
of total exposure. An extension of the liquidity horizon 
from  two  weeks  to  six  months  increases  the  capital 
requirement to 0.77 p.c., which is roughly equivalent to 
a two-notch downgrade of all securities to Baa2 (BBB). 
For lower-graded portfolios, the effect of a downgrade is 
more pronounced than the effect of an extension of the 
liquidity horizon. For example, a B1 (B+) portfolio with 
a two-week horizon requires economic capital equal to 
12.93 p.c. of overall exposure. An extension of the liquid-
ity  horizon  to  six  months  increases  the  capital  require-
ment to 16.44 p.c., which is roughly equivalent to only a 
TABLE  3  ECONOMIC CAPITAL




Correlation = 24 p.c.
 




















1 year  (1)
 
Aaa-Aa2  ........ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43
AA3  ............ 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.38 0.88 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.23 0.43
A1  ............. 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.50 0.88 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.29 0.43
A2  ............. 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.56 0.88 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.32 0.43
A3  ............. 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.77 0.88 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.35 0.46
Baa1   ............ 0.58 0.88 1.46 2.02 2.82 0.30 0.43 0.68 0.96 1.29
Baa2   ............ 0.65 0.88 1.64 2.13 2.96 0.36 2.02 0.77 0.99 1.37
Baa3   ............ 1.09 1.46 2.71 3.48 4.82 0.55 0.68 1.27 1.62 2.24
Ba1   ............. 3.59 3.94 5.47 6.62 8.12 1.65 1.84 2.59 3.14 3.95
Ba2   ............. 3.94 4.39 6.06 7.21 8.81 1.84 2.02 2.85 3.46 4.28
Ba3   ............. 6.87 7.51 10.07 11.97 14.29 3.27 3.58 4.96 6.00 7.36
B1   .............. 12.93 13.88 15.25 16.44 18.27 6.60 7.16 7.96 8.70 9.79
B2   .............. 16.57 17.67 19.25 20.63 22.60 8.74 9.45 10.44 11.36 12.70
B3   .............. 23.07 24.31 26.05 27.50 29.43 13.08 13.99 15.25 16.40 1.80
Caa  ............ 31.28 31.84 32.81 33.58 34.36 24.47 24.70 25.07 25.24 25.33
(1)  In lign with the regulatory guidelines (BCBS, 2007), capital is measured using an annual PD which is subject to a ﬂoor of 3 basis points.
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one-notch downgrade of all securities to a B2 (B) rating. 
This conclusion also holds for similar portfolios assuming 
a  12  p.c.  correlation  between  exposures.  Liquidity  can 
thus  have  a  similar  impact  on  capital  than  changes  in 
traditional credit risk drivers such as changes in the prob-
abilities of default. 
Further, Table 3 illustrates that capital requirements may 
increase rapidly in a crisis situation in which liquidity dries 
up and in which credit risk gets worse. Suppose that, in 
normal circumstances, a bank holds a tradable loan port-
folio that only includes A3 (A–) securities with a two-week 
liquidity horizon. Suppose that, in a stressed situation, all 
securities in this portfolio get downgraded to Baa2 (BBB) 
and the liquidity horizon widens to six months. The results 
show that, for a portfolio assuming 12 p.c. correlation, 
capital requirements increase from 0.18 p.c. to 0.99 p.c., 
which is a difference of 0.81 p.c. in absolute values. This 
difference widens to 1.89 p.c. (from 0.24 p.c. to 2.13 p.c.) 
if the correlation assumption is raised to 24 p.c. These 
new capital requirements for default risk, which come on 
top of current capital requirements for market risk, may 
thus lead to a significant increase in banks’ total capital 
requirements, particularly in distressed circumstances. 
The  current  crisis  provides  an  interesting  context  for 
the debate on the adequacy of the incremental default 
charge. Market liquidity for a large number of products 
has dried up due to the difficulties in assessing the risks 
associated with these products. Initially, liquidity problems 
only emerged in markets for securitised assets, but they 
gradually spread to other market segments, such as the 
market  for  credit  default  swaps.  This  signals  that  the 
minimum  ten-day  liquidity  horizon  may  not  be  a  suf-
ficiently conservative assumption for a large number of 
products, certainly not in the type of stressed conditions 
experienced by those markets in recent times. Another 
aspect of the recent turmoil has been the exceptionally 
high number of downgrades of mortgage-backed securi-
ties and structured finance CDOs. For instance, Moody’s 
reported that the twelve-month downgrade rate for the 
global structured finance market climbed to 7.4 p.c. in 
2007 from 1.2 p.c. in 2006, while the upgrade rate fell 
from 3.6 p.c. to 2.2 p.c. (Moody’s, 2008). This unprec-
edented rate of downward credit migration even in the 
most  super  senior  tranches  exceeds  anything  that  had   
been observed in the past. However, given that the new 
capital rules only refer to default risk and not to rating 
migration risk, had they already been implemented, they 
would most likely not have been sufficient to cover some 
of the recent trading book losses. The current crisis illus-
trates the importance of banks holding sufficient capital 
for trading book positions for situations in which liquid-
ity evaporates and in which credit risk, both default and 
rating migration risk, soars. 
Conclusion
The  rapid  growth  in  relatively  illiquid  default-sensitive 
products in the trading book has led regulators to intro-
duce a new default risk charge for trading book positions. 
The novelty of this default risk charge in the trading book 
is that it takes account of the fact that trading book posi-
tions  are  actively  traded  positions.  Default  risk  can  be 
reduced when it can be sold or hedged in liquid markets. 
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it has described the 
regulatory regime of measuring market and default risks 
in the trading book. Second, it has illustrated the potential 
effect of liquidity on capital requirements for default risk 
in the trading book and compared this with the effect of 
a change in credit quality. 
The new trading book rules for an incremental default 
capital  charge  aim  to  strengthen  banks’  resilience  to 
losses incurred on less liquid positions during normal and 
turbulent market conditions so as to provide a better safe-
guard  against  the  consequences  of  market  dislocation. 
They also aim to help to achieve one of the objectives of 
the Basel II Framework, namely promoting improved risk 
management techniques. However, experience during the 
recent crisis suggests that even if the new trading book 
rules for default risk had already been implemented, it 
is likely that they would not have covered some of the 
trading book losses. This suggests that it is worth devot-
ing further attention to adequately measure the different 
types of risk in trading books, including the types of event 
risk that have led to current losses such as rating migra-
tion risks. Indeed, the Basel Committee is currently ana-
lysing how to extend the scope of the existing proposed 
guidelines  for  incremental  default  risk  to  include  other 
potential event risks in the trading book.172
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